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BOOK REVIEWS
THE MIRAGE OF OIL PROTECTION
ROBERT L. BRADLEY, JR.
Landham, MD: University Press of America, 1989.
Pp. 266. Soft cover.
The Mirage of Oil Protection by Robert L. Bradley, Jr. demolishes
even the most sophisticated arguments in favor of oil protectionism. Mr.
Bradley categorizes the various tariff fallacies into three groups-historical, institutional, and theoretical-and shows why they are fallacies by
use of much empirical evidence and tight reasoning. For example, the
historical fallacy is based on the belief that past oil crises were caused
by exogeneous factors and that the crises could have been prevented or
lessened by government intervention. This theory is demolished by a
review of what actually happened. The various oil crises we have had
are inextricably linked to government intervention rather than to the exogeneous variables that the protectionism was intended to neutralize.
The institutional fallacy is also exploded by an examination of the
facts. Rather than blaming OPEC for our oil troubles, he shows that
OPEC, various nation-to-nation embargoes, production cutbacks, and
disruptions have little effect in a complex and interdependent world oil
market that allows free trade and interfuel substitution. Entrepreneurship
does a good job of neutralizing the effects of the oil cartel.
The theoretical fallacy is just another version of the market failure
fallacy that has been demolished by Tyler Cowen and others.' Basically,
the theory of market failure asserts that the market has somehow failed
and that this failure justifies government intervention. Aside from the fact
that this reasoning involves a non sequitur, Bradley shows that when this
theory is matched with the facts, it just does not hold up. The alleged
market failure of the price system to alleviate the alleged gap between
market price and the "true" price of imported oil cannot be overcome
by imposing a tariff, and Bradley points that out in no uncertain terms.
Bradley exposes the oil tariff for what it is-a massive wealth transfer
from energy consumers to energy producers and the United States Treasury. Energy using companies must face higher costs, which makes them
less competitive with foreign competitors who are not forced to pay the
tariff. An oil tariff produces a dead-weight loss on the economy and
spawns energy-user inequities that affect the poorest consumers the most.
He concludes that oil tariffs and quotas cannot be justified on utilitarian
grounds, and that such protectionist measures are merely an excuse that
special interests use to feather their own nest at the expense of the rest
I. The Theory of Market Failur: A Critical Examination (T. Cowen ed. 1989).
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of us. Placing a tariff or quota on oil will not lead to lower prices, energy
security, or stability and prosperity. In fact, these measures will tend to
have just the opposite effect.
A number of groups would be harmed by an oil import quota or tariff.
A higher tariff would lead to higher fuel costs, which would lead to a
decrease in driving. Auto workers in Detroit and elsewhere would be hurt
because of the reduced demand for their product and that is a major reason
why the United Auto Workers union has come out in opposition to an oil
tariff. The transportation industry, which accounts for about 20 percent
of GNP, would also be hurt since it consumes 62 percent of all petroleum
used in the.United States. The air-fare wars have been made possible, in
part, because of lower petroleum prices, and placing a $10 per barrel
tariff on oil, as some have advocated, would cost airlines $3 billion a
year, which is four times their total 1985 profits and is more than the
total net income of the 2,100 trucking companies that file reports with
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The energy-intensive agriculture
industry would also be hurt by a tariff and would not be able to pass on
much of the added cost unless government offered protection to it as
well. The domestic tire industry, which uses 7 gallons of oil for each tire
it produces, came out against a tariff because it would place domestic
tire producers at a competitive disadvantage over foreign producers. The
homebuilding, road building, and plastic industries also oppose an oil
tariff because it would increase their costs and make them less competitive. The only beneficiaries of an oil tariff are the oil producers, who
would be shielded from foreign competition at the expense of everyone
else.
The national defense argument is one that has been used ever since
the time of Adam Smith as an excuse for protection of any number of
industries. But, as Bradley points out, protecting the oil industry may
actually weaken our defense posture. He quotes Clarence Randall, a
former chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Development, as
follows:
I think that the placing of any restrictions on oil imports is wrong.
... Ostensibly, the program is based on national security, but if
domestic petroleum reserves are required for our defense in war, or
our recovery after war, I do not see how we advance, toward that
objective by using up our reserves. It seems to me that our policy
should be to conserve that which we have, rather than to take measures which would cause our supplies to be exhausted more rapidly.
(p. 204)
Bradley proposes a way out of this morass. Higher oil tariffs should
be rejected as a solution because they are anti-consumer and are a dead-
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weight cost to the economy. The domestic oil industry should be deregulated so that productive forces can be allowed to flow freely. Deregulation will also expand industry opportunities and reduce the cost of
doing business, which adds to profitability. Reducing or eliminating some
of the many federal, state, and local taxes will also increase productivity
and profitability. Oil assets now in the public sector, such as crude oil
production and storage facilities, should be privatized so that they can
be used more efficiently.
This book provides a wealth of evidence to suggest that oil tariffs and
quotas will do more harm than good. It should be read by anyone who
has ever thought that government policy can be used as a tool to make
the domestic oil industry stronger.
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